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ABSTRACT
This paper studies both theoretically and empirically the determinants of group formation
and of the degree of participation when the population is heterogeneous, both in terms of income
and race or etimicity. We are especially interested in whether and how much the degree of
heterogeneity in communities influences the amount of participation in different types of groups.
Using survey data on group membership and data on US localities, we find that, after controlling
for many individual characteristics, participation in social activities is significantly lower in more
unequal and in more racially or ethnically fragmented localities. We also find that those
individuals who express views against racial mixing are less prone to participate in the groups the
more racially heterogeneous their community is.
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This paper studies the socio-economic determinants of participation in groups
and social activities. This is an important issue for more than one reason.
For example, political participation (voting and political action) has criti-
cal implications on policy choices.' If participation is low and the wealthy
or more educated have a disproportionate propensity to vote and engage in
political action, then public policies may be tilted in their favor. This may
lead to vicious circles, in which disadvantaged minorities participate less,
have less 'voice' and become even more disadvantaged, leading to a variety
of social problems.2 Second, participation has important economic effects.
For instance, macroeconomists have argued that active interactions amongst
individuals lead to transmission of knowledge, increases in aggregate human
capital, and the development of 'trust', which improves the functioning of
markets.3 In addition, social interactions and networks affect many individ-
ual outcomes, from criminal activities, to fertility, to the labor supply.4 Even
though participation is typically associated with 'positive' socio-economic
outcomes, social networks may also transmit 'negative' norms. For exam-
ple, the so called 'culture of poverty and welfare' may find its roots in social
networks propagating incentives to search for welfare rather than work.5
Most of the empirical literature studies how individual characteristics
determine the individuals' choice to participate or not. We focus instead on
how certain characteristics of communities influence the degree and nature
of social interactions within them. We consider social activities like those
occurring in religious groups, hobby clubs, youth groups, sport groups etc.
Our interest in these social activities is motivated by Putnam (1993, 1995a,b)
who suggests that this type of social interactions are particularly conducive
to generating the beneficial effects of the so called 'social capital'6. As for
'See Verba and Nie (1985) and Verba Scholtzman and Brady (1995).
2See Wilson (1987,1997) for a discussion of this type of vicious circles in american cities.
theeffects of positive spillovers in the transmission of human capital see Romer
(1986) Lucas (1988) and Benabou (1996). On trust, see La Porta et al. (1997).
4For theoretical work on the effects of tramsmission of informations in group and "in-
formational cascades" see for instance Banerjee (1992) and Ellison and Fudemberg (1995).
For empirical work on the importance of networks see Case and Katz (1992) and Betrand,
Luttmer and Mullainhn (1998)
'See in particular Cutler and Glaeser (1997) and Betrand, Luttmer and Mullainathan
(1998) for recent empirical work on this important question.
6See Coleman (1983) for an extensive discussion of the concept of 'social capial'.
1the characteristic of the community, we study the role of heterogeneity in
income, race and ethnicity. We want to know whether or not heterogeneity
deters participation and social interaction.
Recent work has observed a positive bivariate correlation between in-
equality and social capital measures at the state level.7 Our multivariate
analysis, conducted with individual level data on participation and commu-
nity level measures of income inequality, sheds light on this issue. As for
race and ethnicity, much empirical research has studied the effects on public
policy of ethnic and racial heterogeneity. For instance, Alesina, Baqir and
Easterly (1999; 1998) show that the supply of 'core' productive public goods
is lower and measures of patronage are higher in more racially fragmented lo-
calities. Glaeser, Scheinkman and Shleifer (1995), Cutler and Glaeser (1997),
Poterba (1996), Luttmer (1997), and Goldin and Katz (1998) study the role
of racial conflict as a determinant of education policies and several other
characteristics of US cities.
In our model individuals prefer to interact with others who are similar
to themselves in terms of income, race or ethnicity. If preferences are cor-
related to these characteristics, then our assumption is equivalent to saying
that individual prefer to join groups composed of individuals with preferences
similar to their own.8 Given this setup, one may expect that diffuse prefer-
ences for homogeneity may decrease total participation in a mixed group if
fragmentation increases. This is not necessarily the case. Going from a com-
munity which is, say, 90 percent white and 10 percent black, to one which is
more fragmented, say 50-50, may or may not reduce participation in a mixed
group. It depends on whether or not the loss of white participants is more
than compensated by the increase in black participation. The implications
of an increase in heterogeneity are even less clear if multiple groups can be
formed. In this case, in fact, an increase in heterogeneity may lead to the cre-
ation of many homogenous small groups, leading to an increase or decrease of
total participation. In our theoretical section, we develop conditions under
which more heterogeneity lead to less (or more) participation.
Our empirical results on US localities suggest that income inequality and
7Robert Putnam, presentation at the Saguaro Seminar, October 1998, Harvard Uni-
versity.
STheoretical results by Conley and Wooders (1996) are consistent with this assumption.
They show that when agents can be crowded (positively or negatively) by the skills of other
people in their jurisdictions, taste homogeneous jurisdictions are optimal. To the extent
that tastes are correlated with income and race, our assumption follows.
2racial and ethnic heterogeneity reduce the propensity to participate in a vari-
ety of social activities including recreational, religious, civic and educational
groups.9 Amongst the two, racial fragmentation seems to have a stronger neg-
ative effect on participation. Furthermore, and consistently with our model,
these results are stronger for the groups in which direct contact amongst
members is more important, like churches and youth clubs, while hetero-
geneity matters less or not at all in groups with low degree of interaction.
Finally, our model predicts that individuals more averse to mixing with differ-
ent types should be those more negatively influenced to heterogeneity in the
community. To test this more stringent implication of the model, we exploit
individual data on attitudes towards race relations (e.g., questions on mixed
marriages, busing, etc.), and we find that the (negative) effect of racial het-
erogeneity on participation is significantly stronger for the individuals more
averse to racial mixing.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a model that gen-
erates predictions linking heterogeneity of the population and the level of
participation in social activities. Section 3 describes our empirical strategy
and data. Section 4 highlights some simple correlations at the state level
between income inequality, racial and ethnic fragmentation, and measures of
participation and social capital. Section 5 presents our econometric results.
The last section concludes.
2 The model
Consider a community populated by two types, 'blacks' and 'whites', their
size being B > 0 and W > 0, respectively. It is easier to think about 'race'
(or ethnicity) as what identifies the types, for the moment. Below we discuss
how to think about other discriminating characteristics, especially income.
Each individual has to decide whether or not to participate in a group.
We assume that there exists a minimum size of the group equal to 1/2 of the
total population, in order to ensure that at most one group will emerge in
equilibrium. Below we briefly discuss the case of multiple groups. There are
no congestion costs and no economies of scale: group size does not influence
9We define by 'race' the census classification of black, white, Asian, American Indian,
and other. We define by ethnicity, the classification by ancestry, like Italian, Irish etc.
Throughout this paper, we will use the terms 'white' and 'black' instead of Caucasian and
African American, for the sake of brevity.
3individual utility. Members of the group cannot exclude new members and
entry in (exit from) the group is free and costless. The reservation utility from
non participation is i1 for everybody. The reservation utility may of course
be a function of individual characteristics. While this is important for the
empirical analysis which follows, we will abstract from it in the theoretical
discussion.'°
Let Pw (PB) be the proportion of whites (blacks) participating in the
social activity. The utility from participation depends on individual charac-
teristics and on the group's composition as follows:
u=u(a,Pw) ifiEB (1)
u'=u(a',PB) if jeW (2)
u(.)<0,up()<0
where u(.) is continuously differentiable in both arguments; Ua() and Up(S)
represent the partial derivatives of u(.) with respect to a and to the propor-
tion of the opposite type, respectively. Equation (1) represents the utility
function of the generic member i of type B, and (2) is the analogous for types
W. Underlying assumption up(.)<0is the preference for participating in a
social activity with members of one's own type. The parameter a, which is
a taste indicator, captures the intensity of individual i's preference for par-
ticipation in a group: higher values of a2 imply lower desire for participation.
If we suppose that the cross derivative of u(.) with respect to a and P is
negative (e.g., because a and P enter multiplicatively), higher values of a
indicate more aversion to the opposite race. We do not need this assumption
to develop the theory, but in the empirical part we discuss how 'aversion to
the opposite race' strictly defined influences behavior. For brevity, we will
identify a as the 'degree of intolerance' or 'aversion'.
An individual i of type B participates if and only if u(a, P) ￿ i, or
a<g(ii,P) (3)
where g(.) is obtained inverting u(.). Ourassumptionson u(.) imply that
both the partial derivative of g(•) with respect to and that with respect
'°Note that since we only have at most one group formed, the alternative to belonging
to the group is abstaining from participation altogether. This would not be the case if
multiple groups were allowed.
4to P are negative. In what follows we will indicate the latter derivative by
g'() <0. Analogously, an individual of type W participates if and only if
cx<g(n,PB) (4)
where again g'(•) <0. Note that in (3) and (4) the function g() is the same
for the two types, since u(.) is the same in (1) and (2).
Assume a and c have the same differentiable cumulative distribution
F(.). Then the total mass of individuals type B and type W who participate
in the social activity is, respectively,
B = (5)
W =Pr{4'g(u,PB)}WF[g(ü,PB)]. W (6)
2.1 Equilibrium
Definition 1 An equilibrium is a group composition (Ph, P) such that
for both types none of the members wishes to leave the group and none of the
non-members wishes to join.
In equilibrium the proportion of individuals of type B in the group, PB,
must be equal to the ratio of the mass of the participants B to the total




which together give us the 'fixed point' equilibrium condition contained in
the following.
Proposition 1 There exists at least one equilibrium P e [0, 1] which solves
— F[g(i,1—PB)]
(9) B—
F[g(,l —PB)]+ F [g(ü, PB)] (W/B)
5Proof: The proof of this proposition like all the other proofs is in Ap-
pendix A.
In what follows, for notational convenience we will suppress the term
1Z from the arguments of g(). We are interested in the properties of our
equilibrium (equilibria).
Definition 2 An equilibrium (P, 1 —P)is locally stable if for given W
and B a small perturbation, say to (P + 6,1—P—6) with60, reverts
to the original (Ph, 1 —P).
Inother words, a group is 'stable' if when we add (remove) one member
of either type, so that the composition of the group changes, this individual
will choose to exit (re-enter) the group.
Remark 1 A necessary and sufficient condition for (Ps, 1—P) to be locally
stable is that




Togain some insights into the meaning of condition (10), it is useful to
think in graphical terms. The equilibrium value(s) of PB is (are) given by
the intersection of the function in the right hand side of (9) with the 45°
line. The right hand side of (9) represents the fraction of members type B
inthe group that is 'generated by the reactions' of both types to a given
composition (PB, 1 —PB).The intersection(s) with the identity line give(s)
the value(s) of PB at which both reactions are consistent with the actual
proportions. Our stability condition requires that the slope of the above
function at the point of intersection with the 45° line be less than one.
[Insert figure 1]
Figure 1 depicts various possible configurations of equilibria. In panel (a),
there is a unique interior equilibrium, i.e. the group that forms is 'mixed',
with a proportion P e(0,1) of blacks and (1 —P)of whites. This equi-
librium is stable: in fact if we perturb P to the right or to the left, the
6movement along the curve brings us back to the initial equilibrium. This can
be understood as follows. Suppose you add one or more black members to
the group, so the composition becomes PB > P. The shape of the curve in
panel (a) suggests that this 'more favorable' composition for types B does not
trigger enough participation of new B members, nor does it induce enough
W members to exit, so the group goes back to the initial equilibrium. In
panel (d) the opposite occurs, that is, any slight increase (reduction) in the
fraction of B members from P will trigger an inflow (outflow) of B types
and outflow (inflow) of W types, so that the composition of the group goes
all the way to complete homogeneity with P =1(P =1).While in panel
(d) either P 0 or P =1can in principle be stable equilibria", in panel
(b) only P =0is. Finally, panel (c) illustrates the case of multiple equilib-
ria. Of the five equilibria depicted in the figure, only P, and P3 are stable,
while 0, P2, and 1 are unstable.
The issue of the selection among multiple equilibria will not be addressed
in this paper. As a first approximation, we can think that initially all the
population is in the group, or alternatively that the 'prior' of every individual
on the group composition is equal to the composition of the population. This
will ensure that the 'starting point' on the graph is P =B/(B+ W) and
that simple dynamics will bring the group to the stable equilibrium that is
closest to P.
We are interested in two features of the equilibrium. The first is how the
composition of the group relates to the composition of the total population;
the second is who among the heterogeneous individuals of a given type will
choose to participate and who will stay out. We answer these questions by
establishing the following results.
Lemma 1 Let (Ph, P) be a unique stable equilibrium. Then B < W ==
B< W
Corollary1 If B W and (Pa, P1,) is a unique stable equilibrium, then P B B P either—-< <1 orl<—<—--. Pw W W Pw
Corollary 2 Let (Ps, P) be a unique stable equilibrium. The individu-
als type B and W who participate are those whose cj 's fall in the intervals
"As a matter of fact, given our assumptions that B< W andthat the minimum size
of the group is 1/2, only P1, =1can be a stable equilibrium.
7[oB] and[0W]respectively,where Bg(u,P,,) and"7g(il, Ps). In
particular, B <W-B<W
Lemma1 says that the type who is a minority in the population will be a
minority also in the group. Even more, corollary 1 shows that the unbalance
between the types in the population is magnified within the group: not only
is the minority type under-represented in the social activity, but it is less
than proportionately represented compared to its weight in the population.
Thus, the social group is more homogeneous than the whole population, and
this result is consistent with the under representation of minorities which
we observe in many social activities. Corollary 2 can help us understand
this result. In general, among both types only the individuals more 'prone'
to participating, or less averse to diversity (i.e. the low c's), will join the
group. Suppose B <W.Although the two types have the same ex ante
distribution of o, it is not possible to observe the same degree of 'aversion'
for B and W in the equilibrium composition of the group. If this were true,
the same should be indifferent between participating as a majority or as
a minority. Instead, the fact that B is under-represented in the population
induces even some relatively 'moderate' B individuals (low c) to stay out,
while W individuals manage to keep some relatively 'participation averse'
(high ci) members in the group. This coupled with the sheer unbalance in
the numbers B and W produces the 'magnification' effect described above.
2.2 Heterogeneity and participation
We are finally ready to study how a change in the heterogeneity of the pop-
ulation influences the total amount of participants. First of all, we define
precisely what we mean by 'heterogeneity'.
Definition 3 The degree of heterogeneity is the probability that two ran-
domly drawn individuals from the population belong to different types.
We will use the same definition in our empirical analysis below. Obvi-
ously, in our case of two types, a fifty-fifty split has the maximum level of
heterogeneity. Denote with w the fraction of 'whites' in the population, i.e.
11,T
W+B
8Remark 2 An increase in w represents a decrease in heterogeneity if w >
1/2 andan increase if w <1/2.
Definition 4 The aggregate level of participation S is the share of the
total population who belongs to the group:
S =F[g(1-P)](1-w)+F[g(P)]w (11)
We are interested in how S changes with changes in the composition of the
population. Under very mild sufficient conditions on F(.) and g(.),described
in Appendix A, the following holds.
Proposition 2 If a unique stable equilibrium exists, an increase in hetero-
geneity reduces total participation, i.e.
dS 1 <0 w<—
dw 2
If more than one stable equilibrium exists, the previous result holds 'locally'
around each of the equilibria.
The intuition underlying proposition 2 is simple. We have established that
in equilibrium the minority type is under-represented in the social activity,
e.g. if B <Wthen P <P,and that the fraction of group members of
a given type is increasing in the relative size of that type in the population
(3P/Dw >0).Consider what happens when whites are the majority (w>
1/2) and the fraction of whites in the population decreases —an increase
in heterogeneity. First of all, since the fraction of whites who participates
is higher than that of blacks, i.e. F [g(P)] >F[g(1 —P)],the fall in
W creates an absolute loss in participants greater than the increase in B.
Furthermore, the fractions of the two types who participate change with the
new value of heterogeneity. The sufficient condition mentioned in the text
ensures that the increase in the fraction of blacks is not so overwhelmingly
larger than the decrease in the fraction of whites to overcome the first effect.
2.3 Two examples
Two simple examples highlight the critical features of our results.
92.3.1 Example 1
Suppose that c is distributed uniformly on [0, 1] and that the utility functions
are:
i—cjv uv = 1\/
Therefore, u <0 and >0.A positive second derivative implies
that increasing the proportion of whites decreases the marginal utility of
blacks by more if there are very few whites. Suppose that a group is com-
pletely homogeneous; the first few participants of different types may require
the adoption of different procedures, a different language etc. These costs




The fixed point equilibrium condition, i.e. the special case of equation
(9), is:
/ —1 /i_w B_+V '
Note that the reservation utilitydoes not influence the composition
of the group, but it does influence its size. Consider the following set of
parameter values:=2;1Z =0.6.In this case we have a unique stable
equilibrium in which P, =0.8and P =0.2,as shown in Figure 2a. Also,
B .45B and W .89W, so the aggregate participation rate is S .74.
[Insert figure 2]
As discussed in the general case, we have a magnification effect: the
composition of the group is more tilted in favor of the majority than the
10distribution of types in the population. A ratio B : W of 1 : 2 in the
population translates into 1: 4 within the group. Suppose now that B W,
i.e. the fragmentation is at its maximum value. In this case it is easy to
check that P == andW =B.57B .Theparticipation rate is
now S .57, which is the minimum attainable given our parameter values.
2.3.2Example2
Consider now the following utility functions:
UB =1—c(Pw)2
U1' =1—a(PB)2
In this case both the first and second derivatives of the utility functions
relative to the Pj's (j= B,W) are negative. The interpretation of these
utility functions is the opposite of that of example 1. For instance, we can
think of groups where majority voting matters for certain decisions, so that
the marginal utility of losing members of your own type may be increasing as
you are approaching a half and half split. In this case the interior equilibrium
is described by:
=(+(1)2)1
Using the same parameter values of example 1, namely =2and =
0.6,we get P .67 and P .33. Figure 2b plots the interior equilibrium.
Notice that this equilibrium is unstable: starting for example at an initial
value equal to the composition of the population, PB =1/3,the group would
move towards the corner where only whites participate, i.e. P =0(indeed
this is the oniy stable equilibrium feasible given our requirement that group
size is at least half of the total population). Notice that in this equilibrium all
the whites participate, so S =2/3.If we increase fragmentation by decreasing
W/B while still maintaining W/B> 1, the only stable equilibrium would still
be P =0,P =1,and the participation rate would decrease (because the
mass of participating whites is now smaller).
112.4Extensions and discussion
The simple model outlined above is sufficient to generate the basic prediction
that an increase in heterogeneity will be associated with less participation.
There are, however, a number of issues from which we have abstracted and
which we should discuss briefly.
2.4.1 Tolerance and population shares
The empirical literature on political participation suggests that, after control-
ling for socio-economic status, blacks have a higher propensity to participate
in groups and to vote than whites.'2 In our empirical analysis below, we
also find the same result. The explanation offered by political scientists is
that blacks are more conscious of being a minority and have an extra incen-
tive to engage in political action to preserve their identity and foster their
political and civil rights. In our model this could be accommodated by as-
suming that & =&(W/B), with i =B,W. That is, the propensity to
participate is a function of the distribution of types in the population, with
0QB/a(w/B)> 0and 9&/o(W/B) <0. Therefore if B <W,then we
must have B >aW.This implies that after controlling for all other deter-
minants of participation, one should obtain the empirical finding that blacks
participate more, since they are a minority.
2.4.2 Multiple groups
An important extension of our model would be to allow for the formation
of multiple groups, by reducing their minimum feasible size. In this case
an increase in heterogeneity might simply lead to the formation of multiple
homogeneous groups with uncertain effects on total participation. However,
to the extent that groups cannot be too small (either because there is a
minimum size, or the benefits of participation are decreasing in size)'3 our
basic insight generalize. That is, moving from a more to a less homogeneous
community, the population would sort by 'pushing' on two margins: creating
smaller groups (which are more costly or less beneficial), and increasing the
'2See for instance Verba and Nie (1987)
13There could also be congestion costs, but this is less relevant for the issue under
consideration; here we are concerned about the possibility of equilibria with many small
homogeneous groups.
12heterogeneity of the existing groups.14
More specifically, consider a population which is totally homogeneous,
and suppose that the number of groups chosen is x: this is the number which
optimizes the group size, or the trade off between congestion and the costs
of being too small. Consider now an increase in heterogeneity, holding the
total population constant. In the new equilibrium there will be more groups
and, in general, they will be less homogeneous. This is indeed the result of
reoptimizing along two margins: homogeneity and size. Since in the original
equilibrium the group size was at its optimal level, the new groups will be
smaller and, by definition of 'optimal size', they will provide lower utility to
their members than the original ones. Thus, some of the previous members
will drop out regardless of their preference for homogeneity. In addition,
individuals who are less tolerant of heterogeneity will also drop out.
2.4.3 More than two types
The extension to more than two types is computationally quite cumbersome.
The precise nature of the results would depend on the structure of prefer-
ences. For instance, one simple case would be that each individual prefers
homogeneity and has no ranking of preferences amongst other types different
from his or her own. Alternatively, individual preferences may be influenced
by the mix of specific types which would be part of the group.'5
2.4.4 Heterogeneity in income
Thus far we have focused on differences across types not based on income.
In the empirical analysis we are also interested in the effect of an increase in
income inequality on participation.
'1Results obtained by Alesina and Spolaore (1997) on endogenous jurisdiction formation,
economies of scale and preference for homogeneity are related to this point.
'5Note that even in the case where an individual's utility is a function of the fraction
of members different from his or her own type, the individual may not be 'indifferent' to
the particular mix of types in the group if decision making rules depend upon relative
shares in the group. For example, suppose there are three types: A, B, C and compare
two possible equilibria with shares (.40, .30, .30) and (.40, .50, .10) respectively. Although
individuals type A may not have any general 'distaste' for B versus C, they might well
prefer the first type of equilibrium, in which they are likely to have more decision power,
to the second. This type of analysis is certainly realistic but goes beyond the scope of the
present work.
13A vast literature in local public finance addresses the issue of group forma-
tion and income levels.'6 Particularly related to our analysis is the work by
Fernandez and Rogerson (1996) and La Ferrara (1998), since both examine
the effects of changes in income inequality. The first two authors show that
the quality of publicly provided education (and, therefore, the benefit of ac-
quiring it) is inversely related to income inequality. La Ferrara (1998) shows
that in a sample drawn form Tanzania, the degree of participation in groups
which provide economic benefits or informal insurance to their members is
inversely related to income inequality in the community.
Our model is not a contribution game. Differences in income matter only
to the extent that they are correlated with preferences and culture. In this
case our formalization could be reinterpreted in terms of income rather than
race, i.e. individuals would prefer to participate in social activities with
people from their own income bracket. A complication, however, is that
income is a 'continuous' variable, while race is much less so: in modelling
income dispersion as a dispersion of 'types' we are therefore simplifying the
analysis. To the extent that the issue of contributions would increase the
preferences of rich individuals to exclude the poor, then income inequality
would matter even more for participation. This suggests a test similar to
that performed by La Ferrara (1998) namely that income inequality should
matter more for participation in groups where the discrepancy in the net
benefits perceived by the rich and the poor is larger.
3 Empirical strategy and data
We assume that at any point in time the 'latent variable' measuring the
expected utility from participation in a group for individual i in community
ccanbe modelled as:
(12)
whereis a vector of individual characteristics; H is a vector of community
variables (including our variables of interest, namely heterogeneity of the
population in terms of income, race, and ethnicity); S is a dummy for the
state where the individual lives; T is a year dummy, andisan e'ror term
normally distributed with mean 0 and variance crc.Thevectors i3, 'y, 6, and
'See for instance Epple and Romer (1991) and the references cited therein.
14A are parameters. We do not observe the 'latent' variable Y but only the
choice made by the individual, which takes value 1 (participate in a group)
ifispositive, and 0 (not participate) otherwise:
P=1if>0 13 P=0ifY0
We estimate the Probit model (12)-(13) using individual level data and
taking Metropolitan Sampling Areas (MSA) and Primary Metropolitan Sam-
pling Areas (PMSA) as 'community' dimension. We are especially interested
in the vector of coefficients 'y, although many of the components of /3 will
also be important to gain insights into the determinants of participation.
The main source of data for our regressions is the General Social Survey
(from now on, GSS) for the years 1974-94. This survey interviews approxi-
mately 1,500 individuals every year from a nationally representative sample,
and contains information on a variety of socio-political indicators, as well as
on demographic and income characteristics of the respondents.17 In particu-
lar, the questionnaire prompts the respondent to answer questions regarding
his or her membership in organizations such as political groups, religious
groups, unions, school associations, service groups, fraternities, sports and
hobby clubs, etc. We use the answers to these questions to construct our
dependent variables. Another interesting feature of the GSS is that it con-
tains information about individual attitudes towards race relations and racial
mixing. This will prove useful for us in that we will draw on these questions
to construct proxies for our parameter of 'participation aversion' (a) in order
to test the implications of our model as strictly as we can.
Among the explanatory variables we include individual controls taken
from the GSS, as well as community variables capturing heterogeneity in
race, ethnicity, and income in the place where the individual lives. The
individual controls, as well as all other variables, are described in Appendix
B. The remainder of this section illustrates our procedure for constructing
community level variables.
It is possible to match most respondents from the GSS 1972-1994 with the
'7Note that the survey was not conducted in 1979, 1981, and 1992. Moreover, in 1982
and 1987 black individuals were oversampled, therefore in our regressions we will use the
weights provided by the cumulative GSS file 1972-1994 to correct for this oversampling.
For more detailed information about the GSS, the reader is referred to Davis and Smith
(1994).
15MSA/PMSA where they live. We have therefore used Census data to build
community level variables, adopting the MSA/PMSA as our geographic no-
tion of 'community'. Our measure of income inequality is the Gini coefficient
for the MSA/PMSA computed using family income figures from the 1970,
1980, and 1990 Censuses. The values of Cmi for the remaining years were
obtained by linear interpolation and extrapolation. Our results are not overly
sensitive to the interpolation procedure. Moreover, we computed Gini coef-
ficients at the state level from the Current Population Survey (CPS) every
year between 1974 and 1994, and the correlation between the CPS and the
Census interpolated Gini's was extremely high. The state level Gini's from
the CPS are the ones we use in figures 4, 7, and 8.
Our racial fragmentation index (Race) is constructed from the Census
1990 according to the following formula:
Race =1— s (14)
where i represents a given MSA/PMSA and k the following races: i) White;
ii) Black; iii) American Indian, Eskimo, Aleutian; iv) Asian, Pacific Islander;
v) other. Each term 5kj is the share of race k in the population of MSA/PMSA
i. The index (14) measures the probability that two randomly drawn indi-
viduals in area i belong to different races. Therefore, higher values of the
index represent more racial fragmentation.
The Census did not identify 'Hispanic' as a separate racial category. How-
ever, Alesina Baqir and Easterly (1999), who use the same measure of racial
fragmentation, note that the category 'Hispanic' (which they obtain from a
different source) has a correlation of more than 0.9 with the category 'other'
in the Census data. Our interpretation is that individual of Hispanic origin
checked the 'other' category in the Census survey, since they did not feel well
represented by the four other possibilities. Thus, for all practical purposes,
the category 'other' in the Census is virtually a measure of the Hispanic
population.
The ethnic fragmentation index (Ethnic) is computed by an analogous
formula to (14), using ancestry instead of race. In other words, Ski lfl the
formula now represents the fraction of people in area i whose first ancestry
is type k. The original ancestries reported by the 1990 Census (35 cate-
gories) have been aggregated into 10 different groups on the basis of common
language, culture, and geographic proximity (see Appendix B for a precise
definition). We have chosen to aggregate these data in order not to give the
16same 'weight' in the definition of Ethnic to very similar countries of origin,
say Norway and Sweden, and two very different ones, say India and Ireland.
Our results are not unduly sensitive to reasonable changes in our aggregation
rules.
Note that we use the values of Race and Ethnic in 1990 for the whole
sample. Our reasons for not interpolating are twofold. First, we believe
that racial and ethnic fragmentation within MSAs are sensibly more stable
over time than, say, income inequality. Second, and most importantly, in
order to get variation over time, we should have resorted to the 1970 and
1980 Censuses, which contained fewer categories. For example, all Censuses
before 1990 distinguished only three races: white, black, and other. Relying
on years earlier than 1990 would thus have meant sacrificing the precision of
our heterogeneity measures to a considerable extent. We felt that the loss
in explanatory power due to this oversimplification outweighed the potential
gain from time variation of the above indexes, hence we chose to adopt the
1990 measures as our best proxies for racial and ethnic fragmentation.
4 Descriptive results
We begin by presenting summary statistics and a few simple correlations
among membership rates and our measures of heterogeneity. Summary statis-
tics and definitions of the full set of variables can be found in Appendix B.
[Insert Table 1]
The top panel of Table 1 shows the sample characteristics of some of our
data. Participation rates are on average very high: overall, 72 percent of the
respondents are members of at least one group, the average number of group
memberships being 1.8 per person. Also, there is considerable variation in
participation rates, both across individuals and across groups: the standard
deviation of our basic membership variable is 0.45. The fraction of partici-
pants in the various groups ranges from 0.02 for farmers' associations to 0.35
for religious groups. Sport groups are the second most popular category,
with a participation rate of 0.21, followed by professional associations (0.17),
unions (0.15), and school service groups (0.14). Literary groups, hobby clubs,
fraternities, and service groups (Rotary, Lions, etc.) have participation rates
of 0.10-0.11. Most notable is the low enrollment in political associations: only
5 percent of the respondents are members of a political group. Nationality
17groups, which we will consider in more detail below, are joined by about 4
percent of the respondents.
The last three variables in panel A of the table are measures of hetero-
geneity in income, race, and ethnicity in the MSA's where the respondents
live. The mean of the Gini coefficient is 0.41, with a standard deviation of
0.03. Our racial fragmentation index has a mean of 0.36 (standard deviation
0.14), while ethnic fragmentation is higher at 0.67 (standard deviation 0.07).
The correlations among these three measures of heterogeneity is quite high, as
shown in the bottom panel of Table 1: Cmi is correlated 0.43 with Race and
0.16 with Ethnic; the correlation between Race and Ethnic is 0.56. The high
correlation between these variables should be remembered for the discussion
of our regressions.'8 On the other hand the simple correlation between aver-
age membership in the MSA and the Gini index is -0.23, while that between
membership and racial or ethnic fragmentation is not significant. This will
no longer be true when we turn to multivariate analysis.
Figures 3, 4, 5 and 6 illustrate the geographic distribution of our variables
of interest by reporting sample averages at the State level.
[Insert figures 3,4,5,6]
Figure 3 shows the distribution of participation rates from the GSS data
set, that is the percentage of respondents in each state who are members of at
least one group (average from 1974 to 1994). As one can see this percentage
is highest in states of the north central and northwest regions, and lowest in
the south and south east. Figures 4, 5, and 6 show the distribution of the
Gini coefficient (average 1974-94 from CPS data), of Racial fragmentation,
and of Ethnic fragmentation (both measured in 1990), all calculated at the
State level. These maps show a rather striking pattern, when compared with
Figure 3: racial and ethnic fragmentation, as well as income inequality, are
highest in the south east and lowest in the north east, i.e. those regions
where participation is, respectively, lowest and highest.
18We also explored the correlation among our heterogeneity variables and the measures
of racial or income segregation of Cutler, Glaeser and Vigdor (1999). It turns out that
segregation by income is positively correlated with income inequality, and that the various
measures of racial segregation are positively correlated with racial and ethnic fragmen-
tation. This may suggest that segregation is 'valued' relatively highly in places where
heterogeneity is higher, an observation consistent with the argument that individuals pre-
fer contact with people similar to themselves.
18[Insert figures 7,8]
Similar implications can be gathered from the three panels of Figure 7,
which plot state level participation rates against the Gini index, Race frag-
mentation, and Ethnic fragmentation. In all three panels a negative correla-
tion between membership in groups and heterogeneity clearly emerges. We
tried similar plots for other dimensions of 'social capital' and 'civic culture'
derived from the GSS 1972-94, namely for Trust —defined as the percentage
of respondents in each state who say that "most people can be trusted"—
and for Vote —the percentage of respondents who voted in the last presiden-
tial election— and the pattern was strikingly sintilar. A synthetic view of
these results can be gathered by figure 8, which plots Cmi, Race, and Ethnic
against an aggregate index of social capital. This index is constructed by ex-
tracting the principal components from the three variables above which we
computed from the GSS, i.e. Member, Trust, and Vote.19 Again, these simple
correlations suggest a strong negative correlation between various forms of
heterogeneity and what we generally think of as 'social capital'.
5 The Econometric evidence
5.1 Basic Regressions
Table 2 displays our basic probit regression using the GSS data set and
including only individual controls. The dependent variable takes the value
1 if the respondent belongs to at least one group, and 0 otherwise. The
regressors include a set of individual characteristics which, in our model,
may influence either the individual's reservation utility if not participating, ,orthe preference for participation for given group composition (captured
by the parameter a). The political science literature has generally looked at
these individual determinants of participation in isolation, i.e. correlating
one or two variables at a time with membership rates.2°
'9Principal component analysis has been typically used by the related literature to
construct a single index of social capital (see, among the others, Putnam and Yonish
(1998)).
20See for instance Verba and Nie (1987), and Verba, Schlozman and Brady (1995). A
multivariate analysis with demographic controls similar to those we include is in Glaeser
and Glendon (1997), but their dependent variable is church attendance rather than group
participation.
19[Insert table 2]
The estimates in the first column of Table 2 are marginal probit coeffi-
cients evaluated at the means; in the second column we report heteroskedas-
ticity corrected standard errors adjusted for intra-MSA clustering of the resid-
uals. First of all, the cohort variable suggests a decline in participation by
younger cohorts. Secondly, the age distribution variables show a dip in par-
ticipation for individual in their thirties. Child raising activities reduce the
time available for participation: in fact the coefficient on the variable that
captures whether the respondent has children below the age of 5 is nega-
tive and significant. Note that the dummy for age group 30-39 and that for
children below age 5 are highly correlated. More generally, both variables
capture a period of individual lifetime which is particularly 'busy' because
of marriage, having children, setting up new households, etc. There is some
weak evidence that older people participate more, probably because they
have more time if they are retired, although health considerations may work
the other way. This result, together with the cohort effect, accounts for the
notion of 'older civic generation' emphasized by Putnam (1995a,b).
Years of schooling are positively associated with participation: high school
dropouts participate significantly less, while college graduates significantly
more. The coefficients on the education variables remain highly significant
and stable throughout all specifications. Among the possible explanations
for this strong association, Verba and Nie (1987) suggest that more educa-
tion is generally combined with a higher evaluation of one's own ability to
influence socio-political outcomes, and with a higher level of social interac-
tion. In Table 2 we also see that women participate significantly less than
men. Our interpretation is that they often carry the weight of a job plus
a preponderant share of household chores and child raising activities. This
heavy load leaves women with less time for leisure and participation. This
is corroborated by the fact that women do not participate less in voting, an
act of participation which does not require a significant amount of time21.
Participation is increasing in family income of the respondent, suggesting
that participation is a 'normal good'.
Consider now the time spent at work. The omitted category captures
people who are not working, including housekeepers, retirees, students and
unemployed. After controlling for the level of income, the effect of time
21Results on this point using the GSS data are available from the authors.
20spent at work could be twofold. On the one hand, a constraint on time may
decrease participation; on the other hand, socialization in the workplace may
increase social interaction, incentives, and ability to participate. Our results
on this point are consistent with basic economic principles. The coefficient
on part time workers is larger (and significantly so) than the one on full time
workers. This suggests that, even though socialization in the workplace helps
(in fact full time workers participate more than those out of the labor force),
the time constraint is binding for people who work full time. It is less binding
for part time workers who, on the other hand, still get the benefits of social
interactions in the workplace.22 When we control for all these variables,
marital status does not seem to affect participation (contrary to the common
notion in sociological and political analyses based on partial correlations,
which indicate that married people participate significantly more).
For our purposes, a particularly interesting variable is b1ack'. As we can
see from Table 2, ceteris parib'us members of this racial group participate
significantly more, a result which emerges clearly when we control for the
other individual determinants of participation but which is obscured if we
only look at partial correlations. Note that this result is not driven by the
higher church attendance of blacks in the south: in fact it survives if churches
are left out of the definition of groups and if the south is omitted from the
regression. As discussed above, our model could be extended to incorporate a
feature of group consciousness, in which the minority type participates more
to preserve identity and to defend its role in the community. More impor-
tantly, since blacks are a minority in virtually all MSA's, the percentage of
black residents is positively associated with racial fragmentation. The result
on black propensity to participate implies that if we find that participation is
lower in more racially fragmented communities, this result is not due to the
positive correlation between percentage of blacks and racial fragmentation.
Regressors not shown include year dummies and state dummies. The
pattern of year dummies is broadly consistent with the declining trend in
participation rates, already partly captured by the variable cohort. Many of
the state dummies are statistically significant, indicating a need to include
them.
22This interpretation is confirmed by additional sensitivity analysis which explores al-
ternative specifications and distinguishes between the participation levels of various com-
ponents of the non workers. Interestingly, the unemployed participate less even after
controlling for income. All these results are available from the authors.
21The coefficients on individual controls are very stable and robust to dif-
ferent specifications.23 Therefore, to economize in space from now on we
will not report them, although it should be intended that they have always
been included in the regressions, together with the state and year dummies.
We next extend our analysis by incorporating variables which capture the
characteristics of the community where the respondent lives.
[Insert Table 3]
In Table 3 we include the size of the place where the individual lives,
the median income level in the MSA, and its squared (all in logs), together
with our measures of heterogeneity. Size has a negative but not significant
coefficient, while the coefficients on the income variables indicate that richer
communities participate more but at a decreasing rate. Finally, we move to
the characteristics of communities which are the focus of the present paper.
The first measure of heterogeneity included in column 1 is income inequality.
The coefficient on Cmi is negative and significant at the 1 percent level,
indicating that people living in more unequal communities are less likely to
participate in groups. Column 2 includes our measure of racial fragmentation,
which also has a negative and significant coefficient: individuals living in more
racially fragmented areas participate less. In column 3, 'racial' fragmentation
is replaced by 'ethnic' fragmentation as measured through the ancestry data.
Again, the negative and significant coefficient on this variable suggests that
participation is lower in more ethnically fragmented communities.
In the last three columns of Table 3 we introduce in the same regression
both inequality and our measures of racial and/or ethnic heterogeneity. Cmi
and racial fragmentation remain significant when introduced jointly; how-
ever, the absolute values of their coefficients fall due to the positive correla-
tion among the two variables, highlighted in Table 1. Ethnic fragmentation
remains negative and significant in column 5, but looses significance in the
last colunm when all three measures of heterogeneity are included. This re-
suit may suggest that among the three kinds of heterogeneity we consider,
Ethnic is the one that is less strongly associated with participation, a hy-
pothesis confirmed by the results on the group by group analysis of the next
23We do not include homeownership among our regressors because this would restrict
our sample to 3101 observations only. When included in the regression, homeownership
has a positive and significant coefficient, consistently with the findings of DiPasquale and
Glaeser (1998).
22section. In any case, given the high degree of correlation between the three
indexes of heterogeneity, in what follows we present results from regressions
where the above measures have been introduced one at a time.24
5.2 Sensitivity analysis and causality
In Table 4 we conduct a sensitivity analysis by controlling for influential ob-
servations whose presence would sensibly bias our estimators. We do this by
calculating the DFbetas from each original regression, and dropping those ob-
servations that lead to major changes in the coefficients of our heterogeneity
measures 25
[Insert Table 4]
The results in Table 4 are even stronger than those in table 3, in the sense
that the coefficients on Gini, Race and Ethnic are larger in absolute value.
Using the estimated coefficient in column 1, we calculate that, starting from
the sample mean, an increase in Cmi by one standard deviation leads to a
reduction in the probability of participation of 24 percentage points. This
is quite a sizeable effect, if we compare it to the impact of other significant
determinants of participation. Take for example education. Ceteris paribus,
going from the status of high school dropout of high school graduate or higher
increases the probability of being member of a group by about 13 percent-
age points. From the above estimate, moving in a community which is one
standard deviation below the mean for inequality increases this probability
by almost twice as much. A similar ratio of magnitudes holds if we compare
the impact of inequality and of college education. Having more than 16 years
of education raises the probability of participating by about 14 percentage
points. Again, this is slightly more than half the impact of a decrease in the
Gini coefficient by one standard deviation.
Racial and ethnic fragmentation also have sizeable, though lower, coeffi-
cients. An increase of one standard deviation in racial fragmentation (column
2) implies a reduction in the propensity to participate of about 8 percentage
24When we introduced them jointly, the results we obtained were broadly consistent but
in some instances some of the three would lose statistical significance at standard levels of
confidence.
25Specifically, we dropped those observations for which abs(DFbeta) > 2/.,/b (see
e.g., Belsley et al. (1980), p.28).
23points. A similar result (6 percentage points) holds for the ethnic fragmen-
tation. This is not too high compared to the impact of education, but is
still definitely relevant compared to other variables. For instance, we have
seen that with children below 5 years in age participate significantly less in
social activities, and in particular that, ceteris paribus, their probability of
being members of a group is 3 percentage points lower than that of someone
who does not have a small child. Well, living in a community that is one
standard deviation above the mean in racial fragmentation reduces the prob-
ability of participating by almost three time as much. Similarly for ethnic
fragmentation (two times as much).
Finally, it is worth noting that one of the categories included in our
dependent variable is 'nationality groups'. One should expect that for this
type of groups racial and especially ethnic fragmentation should not have a
negative effect, but rather a positive effect (see the next section). We ran
the same regressions of Table 3 excluding nationality groups, and the results
on the effects of racial and ethnic fragmentation were in fact stronger. The
estimated coefficients on Race and Ethnic when the dependent variable is
membership in any group other than a nationality group are reported in
columns 4 and 5 of Table 4. Compared to the estimates of Table 3 (columns
2 and 3, respectively), the impact of racial and ethnic heterogeneity is now
quantitatively more important, as expected.26
We next consider the issue of potential endogeneity. A high degree of
participation may reduce income inequality by increasing availability of in-
formation, options and opportunities.Also communities prone to social
activities may be more favorable to redistributive policies. These problems
are much less important for measure of ethnic or racial fragmentation, there-
fore in Table 5 we concentrate on instrumenting for Gini.
We consider two instruments: the number of municipal and township
governments in 1962, and the share of the labor force employed in man-
ufacturing. The number of governments in 1962 can be safely considered
exogenous to participation in 1974-94 and it can have influenced the de-
gree of income inequality in the MSA. Within a metropolitan area that was
fragmented in many smaller jurisdictions it is more likely that significant
differences in policies, local public good provision, and income 1eves persist
among those jurisdictions. The share of manufacturing is not exogenous to
26Analogous results were obtained on the sample purged of influential observations (i.e.
on the sample comparable to columns 2 and 3 of Table 4).
24union participation, so when we use this instrument we check our results by
excluding unions.
[Insert Table 5]
In column 1 of Table 5 we reproduce our OLS regression for comparison
sake. In column 2 and 3 we instrument Gini with the number of govern-
ments in 1962, and with the same variable plus the share of manufacturing.
Gini remains highly significant in both cases. Since union participation is
certainly not exogenous to share of manufacturing, in columns 4 and 5 we
exclude unions from our membership dependent variable. Once again in
the IV specification Gini remains significant and the coefficient is higher in
absolute value in the IV specification relative to the OLS one.
We should pause to analyze the fact that the coefficient on GINI in the
IV regressions is larger in absolute value that in the OLS ones. Suppose that
individuals who are more likely to participate in social activities are more
favorable to redistribution, thus reducing inequality. This would imply an
upward bias (in absolute value) of the estimated coefficient on Gini in the
participation regression. An alternative argument is that individuals who
are more prone to participate are those who are less averse to mixing with
individuals with a different income level. This is in fact the basic idea of
our model. But then individuals less averse to income heterogeneity may
also be more prone to live in communities with more income heterogeneity.
This would imply a downward bias (in absolute value) of the OLS coefficient
on Gini. The patterns of the coefficient in Table 5 seems to support more
the second interpretation, even though in the regression without unions the
comparisons between coefficients and the Hausman test suggests that perhaps
there is no bias up or down.
Note that a similar argument applies to Racial and Ethnic fragmentation.
Suppose that individuals less averse to racial mixing move to more heteroge-
nous communities. These individuals are also those who are more prone to
participate in mixed groups. Thus, our OLS estimates imply a bias against
finding an effect of racial fragmentation on participation and implies that the
values of the OLS coefficients on Race and Ethnic may be biased downward,
in absolute value.
255.3 Types of groups
The groups included in the GSS questionnaire are quite diverse, ranging
from unions to literary clubs to church groups. It is therefore instructive to
analyze participation in each of them separately to see if heterogeneity plays
a different role in different types of groups. This is done in table 6.
[Insert table 6]
We have run the same regressions of Table 3, using as dependent variable
individual membership in a given type of group. Each cell in the table refers
to a separate regression and shows the marginal probit coefficient on the vari-
able listed by column (Cmi, Race, or Ethnic) for the type of group listed by
row.27 For each group we have excluded from the sample those respondents
that for one reasons or another cannot be members of a particular group.
For instance, individuals below a certain age cannot be member of a veteran
group, non farmers cannot be a member of a farmer group, retirees cannot
be members of a union, etc. The exact exclusion rules from the regression for
each group are reported at the bottom of the table (the qualitative nature of
our results is robust to the specification of these exclusions).
What patterns are we looking for? According to the basic ideas underly-
ing our model, measures of heterogeneity should be less important for groups
with a high degree of excludability and/or a low degree of close interaction
amongst members than for groups with the opposite characteristics.
The results of Table 6 are broadly supportive of these hypotheses. Church
groups are those with the strongest effect of all three types of heterogeneity.
These are groups with virtually no excludability and a high degree of inter-
action. It is worth remembering also that Church groups are the largest ones
in terms of number of participants.
At the opposite extreme we have professional associations and farmers
groups, which have a very low level of personal interaction; the coefficients on
Cmi, Race and Ethnic are in fact insignificant in these regressions. Service
groups, hobby clubs, sports clubs and youth clubs have a high degree of
interaction and a less than perfect degree of excludability. Participation in
27A11 regressions include the individual and community controls listed in previous tables.
We have also run the group by group regressions using the DFbeta method employed in
Table 4. Results are qualitatively similar to those reported in Table 6 and are available
upon request.
26these groups tends to be influenced by some form of heterogeneity, even
though not all the coefficients are significant in every regression.
Interestingly, and consistently with what one would expect, Ethnic frag-
mentation is positively associated with nationality groups. This observation
suggests that in fragmented communities, individuals may feel more of a need
to preserve and actively promote their own cultural identity and values, an
observation broadly consistent with the spirit of our model.
Finally, notice that, aside from church groups, school service groups are
the ones for which income inequality has the strongest negative impact. This
is not surprising, given that high degrees of inequality are likely to be associ-
ated with marked heterogeneity in preferences for the type of education and
services that schools should provide.
5.4 Individual preferences and participation
Our model implies that in heterogeneous and non segregated communities
those who choose not to participate should be individuals who are more
strongly averse to mixing with different types. This implication can be in-
vestigated, since the GSS asks several questions aimed at directly identifying
individual preferences and attitudes toward racial mixing.
[Insert Table 7]
In Table 7 the dependent variable is membership in a subset of groups for
which heterogeneity is important. More specifically, we choose all the groups
for which at least one of the three measures of heterogeneity is negative and
significant at the five per cent level in Table 6. These groups are: church,
hobby, sport, youth, service, political, and school service groups.28 We split
the sample amongst individuals who can be identified as strongly averse to
racial mixing on the basis of their answer to a given question, and individuals
who are indifferent or favorable to racial mixing. Our model implies that, if
we run the participation regression separately for the two sub-samples, the
coefficient on Race should be larger in absolute value for the sub-sample of
individuals relatively more averse to racial mixing.
The GSS includes many questions concerning attitudes towards race re-
lations. Some of them are 'yes' or 'no' questions, others range on a scale of 1
28The results of table 7 are not unduly sensitive to the choice of groups .Theyare
robust to focusing on a smaller or larger subset of groups.
27to 3 or 1 to 4. In all cases, we have created a binary variable distinguishing
'averse' from 'non averse' people, and we have reported a rough description
of the criterion (or question) in rows [1] to [7] of Table 7. Details on the def-
inition of each binary variable, as well as the exact wording of the question
in the GSS, are provided in appendix B. Out of the many questions on race
relations contained in the GSS, we have chosen those for which we had a
sufficiently high number of respondents on both sides.2° Table 7 reports the
marginal probit coefficients on the racial fragmentation variable from a par-
ticipation regression whose sample is split among individuals who answered
'yes' to the question described in each row and individuals who answered
'no' (first and second column, respectively). Each cell of the table therefore
refers to a separate regression which includes all our standard individual and
community controls. The last column in the table simply reports the fraction
of respondents on the 'yes' side of the question.
The estimates in Table 7 provide considerable support for this implication
of our model. For six out of seven questions concerning attitudes toward race,
the effect of racial heterogeneity is significantly stronger for the individuals
more averse to racial mixing ad racial cooperation.
We start from what would seem the strongest measure of aversion to racial
mixing, namely whether one "thinks there should be laws against marriages
between blacks and whites" or not (line [1]). Twenty percent of almost 6,000
respondents answered 'yes' to this question. The negative effect of racial
fragmentation in the community for these people is significantly stronger
than for those who answered 'no' or 'I don't know'.
A particularly interesting question is the one about whether one has had
a black person home for dinner in the past few years.3° In fact, this is a
question concerning individuals' actual behavior, as opposed to a test of a
generic attitude toward race in an abstract sense. Therefore it is a better
29jpracticethis means that we have excluded several questions for which the yes
answer had only about 200 observations. For these cases, the sizes of the coefficients on
Race were consistent with our hypothesis, even though the scarcity of observations made
the estimation unreliable.
30Due to the framing of the question, we restricted the sample to non-blacks oniy. How-
ever, in examining the GSS data we noted that a considerable number of black respondents
had been ansked this question and had answered 'no'. We feel that black respondents may
have interpreted this question as s'ying: "have you had a person of the opposite race home
for dinner?". For this reason we also tried including black respondents in our regression,
and our results were basically unchanged both in terms of significance and of quantitative
values or the estimated coefficients.
28measure of individuals' true attitude toward racial mixing and interracial
direct contacts, which is the essence of our model. In fact, recent results by
Glaeser and Laibson (1999) are quite supportive of this interpretation. They
find that when individuals are asked in abstract they claim to have a large
amount of 'trust' towards others, but their behavior in actual experiments is
much less prone to trusting others. Our results based upon this behavioral
question are very strongly in favor of our hypothesis, as shown in line [2].
The coefficient on Race is negative and highly significant in the sample of
those who did not have a person of the opposite race for dinner and totally
insignificant in the other sample.
We also get particularly strong results for the question concerning busing,
(line [7]), a topic which has been hotly debated and has generated much racial
conflict. The effect of racial fragmentation on the likelihood of participating
in a group is negative and significant for those individuals who oppose busing,
while it is insignificant and close to zero for those who do not. Analogous
results are obtained when we consider respondents who would not vote for a
black president (line [6]), who would object sending their children to a school
where half of the children are of the opposite race, or who think that "blacks
should not push themselves where they are not wanted".
In only one case the results are opposite to our hypothesis: the case of
the question about the right to teach for people who "believe that blacks are
genetically inferior". Note, however, that this question is more related to
one's view about civil liberties than to personal interactions with members
of the opposite race.31
Unfortunately we cannot perform similar tests on our two other measures
of heterogeneity. The GSS does not include questions which can proxy for
attitudes toward ethnicity. As for income heterogeneity, the survey ask a
few questions on attitudes toward redistributive fiscal policy (e.g., whether
the government should actively help the poor, or whether the federal income
tax is too high), but nothing that may capture attitudes toward interactions
with individuals of a different income or social level.
An additional set of variables which we considered are the measures of
racial and income segregation constructed by Cutler, Glaeser, and Vigdor
(1999). Our model does not deal directly with segregation, but one may ar-
31The GSS also includes a question concerning the right to speak for racist individuals.
The answers to this question are very highly correlated with those to the question about
the right to teach for racist individuals.
29gue that in more segregated communities racial and income mixing is lower,
and therefore even people relatively averse to heterogeneity may be willing
to participate in groups. If this interpretation is correct, and if heterogene-
ity and segregation were positively correlated (as indeed they seem to be),
omitting segregation from our regressions would bias our results against find-
ing an effect of heterogeneity on participation. We have tested the effect of
segregation and found results which are only weakly supportive of this inter-
pretation. In particular, the various measures of segregation do not appear
to have always significant coefficients, neither alone nor interacted with the
heterogeneity variables.32 A possible explanation is that several of the groups
in the GSS questionnaire are generally city based, thus segregation may not
be sufficient to prevent mixing, particularly in small cities.
6Conclusions
Participation in social activities is positively associated with several valuable
phenomena, like trust and human capital externalities. The propensity to
participate is of course influenced to a large extent by individual characteris-
tics, but it also depends on the composition and degree of heterogeneity of the
community. In the theoretical part of this paper we show under which condi-
tions more heterogeneity of the population leads to less social interaction. We
then explore the evidence on US cities and find that income inequality and
racial fragmentation are strongly inversely related to participation. Ethnic
fragmentation also influences negatively participation, but perhaps less than
racial fragmentation. The groups that are more affected by heterogeneity
are those in which members directly interact to a significant extent, and in
which excludability is low. Also, in accordance with our model, we find that
the individuals who choose to participate less in racially mixed communities
are those who most vocally oppose racial mixing.
This paper leaves open many avenues for research. For example, the the-
ory for the formation of multiple groups in the same community is only
sketched. A more fully developed model would lead to empirical predictions
concerning how many groups of the same type one should find in the same
community, as a function of the type of group and of the community char-
acteristics. Also, one could focus on one specific group and analyze in more
32A11 these regressions are available upon request.
30detail its actual evolution over time, composition of membership and inter-
nal functioning and relate that to the evolution of income inequality and
racial/ethnic fragmentation in communities. This experiment would require
data which go well beyond what is included in the GSS, such as historical
data collected by specific group organizations.
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33Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 1
Proposition 1 can be proved by applying Brouwer's fixed point theorem to
the function f(PB)definedby the right-hand side of (9).33 Notice first of all
that f(PB) maps the interval [0, 1] into itself, and that [0, 1] is clearly a non
empty, compact, and convex set. All we need to show is therefore that the
right-hand side of (9) is a function, and that it is continuous. This follows
from our assumptions that F(.) is differentiable, u(.) is well-behaved (hence
g(•) is continuously differentiable in PB), and B, W >0. Li
Proof of Remark 1




{F[g(1 —PB)]+ F[g(PB)](W/B)}2 B
(15)
Notice that since F'(.) >0and g'(•) <0,expression (15) is unambiguously
positive. The stability condition (10) requires that (15) is less than 1.
Proof of Lemma 1
The proof of Lemma 1 can be divided in two parts.
(a)B<W==P<P.
Apply the implicit function theorem to (9) to get
IF'[g(1—P)]g'(1—P)—F'[g(P)]g'(P)1_
________ — L F[g(1_P)] F[g(P)]]
B
— a.1 8(W/B) F[g(1—P)]F[g(P)} (W\2 2W — +F[g(1_P)] 'T)+
Under the stability condition (10) this derivative is unambiguously negative.
Note that by symmetry when B =Wthe unique equilibrium must be P =
= P7.Condition (a) follows from these two facts.
33Brouwer's fixed point theorem says that if S CRNis a nonempty, compact, convex
set, aid f S —pSis a continuous function from S into itself, then f(.) has a fixed point.
34(b)P<P=B<W.
By contradiction. Suppose that B> W. Then by the same arguments as
in part (a) we should have P >P,which contradicts the hypothesis. LI
Proof of Corollary 1
Let us start by showing that B <W < . From(7) we can ite
the ratio of the two proportions as
—F[g(Pj4]B
F[g(P)] W
>From Lemma 1, B <Wimplies P >P.Given that F'(.) >0and
g'() <0,this in turn implies F [g(P)] <.F [g(P)], which proves the first
part of the corollary. The second part, namely B> W =-> , canbe
proved with the same arguments. LI
Proof of Corollary 2
Follows from Lemma 1 together with definitions (5) and (6), recalling that
g'(.) <0. LI
Proof of Proposition 2
>From (11) we obtain
={F[g(P)] -F[g(1 -P)1} +{wF' [g(P g'(P) -
—(1
—w)F'[g(1 —P)}g'(l —P)} (a.2)
We need to find the conditions under which (a.2) is negative. Let us start
by showing that w <1/2implies dS/dw <0. As proven in lemma 1, when
w <1/2we have P >P.Given that F'(.) >0and g'() <0, the expression
in the first curly brackets in (a.2) is thus negative. As for the second part
of the derivative, we know that in a stable equilibrium aP/3w <0, so it is
sufficient (but not necessary) to show that the expression in the second curly
brackets is positive to prove our result. This amounts to requiring that
wF'[g(1—P)g'(1—P) 3 1-w<
F'{g(P)]g'(P) (a.)
35Notice that the left hand side of (a.3) is less than one by assumption. There-
fore a sufficient, though not necessary, condition for the above inequality to
hold is that F"(.) ￿ 0 and g"() ￿ 0. Intuitively, F"(.)0 says that the neg-
ative effect of ethnic fragmentation on participation will likely be observed
when the distribution of the a's is uniform or skewed to the right, i.e. when
there is a significant fraction of the population who dislikes interaction with
the opposite race. On the other hand, g"() ￿ 0 describes a situation in
which the fraction of people whose utility exceeds the reservation level de-
creases relatively more at low levels of the proportion of the opposite type
in the group.34 Note, however, that even when F"(.) < 0 and/or g"(•) < 0,
i.e. when most individuals have mild preferences on racial relations, it is still
possible that dS/dw < 0 because all other effects work in this direction. The
conditions F"(.) > 0 and g"(•)0 are in fact 'twice sufficient': the first time
because they are sufficient but not necessary for (a.3) to hold; the second
time because (a.3) is sufficient but not necessary for (a.2) to be satisfied.
The second half of the proposition, namely the fact that dS/dw < 0
implies w < 1/2 under the above sufficient conditions, can be proved by
contradiction taking into account the first part of the proof. LI
App endix B
Variable definition
The following is a list of the variables we use and of their sources, followed by
summary statistics. The data sources are abbreviated as follows: GSS stands
for 'General Social Survey, cumulative file 1972-94'; CensusCD9O refers to the
CDrom "CensusCD+Maps" by GeoLytics, Inc. (1996-98) which contains
data from the Summary Tape Files 3F of the 1990 Census. In all cases from
variables constructed from the GSS, 'no answer' and 'not applicable' were
coded as missing values.
Member: dummy equal to 1 if respondent is member of at least one
group. [Source: authors' calculation on GSS]
Member (exci. nationality): dummy equal to 1 if respondent is mem-
ber of at least one group other than a nationality group [Source: authors'
34This condition is much less restrictive than it looks. In fact it is always satisfied when
c and P enter multiplicatively in the utility function, whatever the exact functional form.
See examples 1 and 2 in the text for an illustration.
36calculation on GSS]
Member (exci. unions): dummy equal to 1 if respondent is member of
at least one group other than a union [Source: authors' calculation on GSS}
Cohort: year of birth of the respondent [Source: GSS]
Age<30: dummy equal to 1 if respondent is less than 30 years old
[Source: authors' calculation on GSS]
Age3O-39: dummy equal to 1 if respondent is between 30 and 39 years
old [Source: authors' calculation on GSS]
Age5O-59: dummy equal to 1 if respondent is between 50 and 59 years
old [Source: authors' calculation on GSS]
Age>60: dummy equal to 1 if respondent is 60 years old or more [Source:
authors' calculation on GSS]
Married: dummy equal to 1 if respondent is married [Source: authors'
calculation on GSS]
Female: dummy equal to 1 if respondent is female [Source: authors'
calculation on GSSI
Black: dummy equal to 1 if respondent is African American [Source:
authors' calculation on GSS]
dummy equal to 1 if respondent is [Source: authors' calculation on GSS]
Educ<12 yrs: dummy equal to 1 if respondent has less than 12 years of
education [Source: authors' calculation on GSS]
Educ>16 yrs: dummy equal to 1 if respondent has more than 16 years
of education [Source: authors' calculation on GSS]
Chi1dren5 yrs: dummy equal to 1 if respondent has children age 5 or
less [Source: authors' calculation on GSSI
Children 6-12: dummy equal to 1 if respondent has children age 6 to
12 [Source: authors' calculation on GSS]
Childrenl3-17: dummy equal to 1 if respondent has children age 13 to
17 [Source: authors' calculation on GSS]
ln(real income): logarithm of respondent's family income (constant
1986 US$) [Source: authors' calculation on GSS]
Full-time: dummy equal to 1 if respondent works full time [Source:
authors' calculation on GSS]
Partime: dummy equal to 1 if respondent works part time [Source: au-
thors' calculation on GSS]
Size of place: logarithm of the size of place where respondent lives
(thousands of people) [Source: authors' calculation on GSS]
37Med HH income: logarithm of median household income in MSA/PMSA
where respondent lives [Source: authors' calculation on CensusCD90]
Med HH income: square of the logarithm of median household income
in MSA/PMSA where respondent lives [Source: authors' calculation on Cen-
susCD9O]
Gini: Gini coefficient on family income in MSA/PMSA where respondent
lives. Actual Gini coefficients were computed for the years 1970, 1980, 1990.
The values for the remaining years in the sample were obtained by linear
interpolation (and extrapolation for 1991-94). [Source: authors' calculation
on IPUMS 1%, Census 1970, 1980, 1990]
Race: racial fragmentation index in MSA/PMSA where respondent lives,
defined in expression (14) in the text. The five categories used for the shares
are the original Census categories: i) white; ii) black; iii) American Indian,
Eskimo, Aleutian; iv) Asian, Pacific Islander; v) other. [Source: authors'
calculation on CensusCD9O]
Ethnic: ethnic fragmentation index in MSA/PMSA where respondent
lives, defined in expression (14) in the text. The 10 categories used for the
shares are obtained aggregating the original 'first ancestries' from the Census
as follows: (1) Arab; (2) Subsaharan African; (3) West Indian; (4) Race or
Hispanic origin; (5) Canadian, United States or American; (6) Austrian, Bel-
gian, Dutch, English, French Canadian, German, Irish, Scotch-Irish, Scottish,
Swiss, Welsh; (7) Czech, Hungarian, Lithuanian, Polish, Romanian, Russian,
Slovak, Ukrainian, Yugoslavian; (8) French, Greek, Italian, Portuguese; (9)
Danish, Finnish, Norwegian, Swedish; (10) other. Each share is computed a
share of people in that category over the total population in the MSA/PMSA
(excluding people with 'ancestry unclassified' and 'ancestry not reported').
[Source: authors' calculation on CensusCD9O1
NGOV62: number of municipal and township governments in the MSA/PMSA
in 1962 [Source: Cutler, Glaeser and Vigdor (1999)1
MANSHR: share of the labor force employed in manufacturing in the
MSA/PMSA in 1990 [Source: Cutler, Glaeser and Vigdor (1999)]
NOMTXMARRTAGE: dummy equal to 1 if respondent is against mixed
marriages. Original GSS survey question: "Do you think there should be laws
against marriages between blacks and whites?". Prompted answers coded in
the GSS variable 'RACMAR': 1=Yes; 2=No; 3=Don't know. Our variable
takes value 1 if RACMAR=1 and zero otherwise. [Source: authors' calcula-
tion on GSS]
NOBLKDINNER: dummy equal to 1 if respondent has not had a black
38person home for dinner in past few years. Original GSS survey question:
"During the last few years, has anyone in your family brought a friend who
was a black home for dinner?". Prompted answers coded in the GSS variable
'RACHOME': 1=Yes; 2No; 8Don't know; 9=No answer. Our variable
takes value 1 if RACHOME=2 and zero otherwise. [Source: authors' calcu-
lation on GSS]
BLKNOPUSH: dummy equal to 1 if respondent thinks that blacks
should not push. Original GSS survey question: "Here are some opinions
other people have expressed in connection with black-white relations. Which
statement on the card comes closest to how you, yourself, feel? The first one
is: Blacks shouldn't push themselves where they're not wanted". Prompted
answers coded in the GSS variable 'RACPUSH': 1Agree strongly; 2=Agree
slightly; 3Disagree slightly; 4Disagree strongly; 8=No opinion; 9=No an-
swer. Our variable takes value 1 if RACPUSH=1 and zero otherwise. [Source:
authors' calculation on GSS]
NOHALFSCHOOL: dummy equal to 1 if respondent would not send
children to school with half opposite race. Original GSS survey question:
"Would you yourself have any objection to sending your children to a school
where half of the children are Whites /Blacks?".Prompted answers coded
in the GSS variable 'RACHAF': 1=Yes; 2=No; 3=Don't know. Our vari-
able takes value 1 if RACMAR=1 and zero otherwise. [Source: authors'
calculation on GSS]
RAG TEACH: dummy equal to 1 if respondent thinks that racists should
be allowed to teach. Original GSS survey question: "Consider a person who
believes that blacks are genetically inferior. Should such a person be allowed
to teach in a college or imiversity, or not?". Prompted answers coded in the
GSS variable 'COLRAC': 4=Yes, allowed; 5=Not allowed; 8=Don't know;
9No answer. Our variable takes value 1 if COLRAC4 and zero otherwise.
Source: authors' calculation on GSS]
NOBLKPRESID: dummy equal to 1 if respondent would not vote for
black president. Original GSS survey question: "If your party nominated a
Black for President, would you vote for him if he were qualified for the job?".
Prompted answers coded in the GSS variable 'RACPRES': 1Yes; 2No;
8=Don't know; 9=No answer. Our variable takes value 1 if RACPRES=2
and zero otherwise. [Source: authors' calculation on GSS]
NOBUSING: dummy equal to 1 if respondent opposes busing. Original
GSS survey question: "In general, do you favor or oppose the busing of black
and white school children from one school district to another?". Prompted
39answers coded in the GSS variable 'BUSING': 1Favor; 2=Oppose; 8=Don't
know; 9No answer. Our variable takes value 1 if BUSING2 and zero
otherwise. [Source: authors' calculation on GSS]
40Table Bi: Summary statistics
MeanStd. Dev. No. obs.
Member .72 .45 10031
Member (exci. nationality).71 .45 9922
Member (exci. unions) 9922
Cohort 1939.85 17.59 10031
Age<30 .25 .43 10031
Age3O-39 .24 .43 10031
Age5O-59 .13 .34 10031
Age￿60 .20 .40 10031
Married .56 .50 10031
Female .56 .50 10031
Black .16 .37 10031
Educ<12 yrs .24 .43 10031
Educ>16 yrs .22 .41 10031
Children5 yrs .19 .39 10031
Children 6-12 .22 .41 10031
Children 13-17 .18 .38 10031
ln(real income) 10.03.93 10031
Fulitime .52 .50 10031
Partime .10 .30 10031
Size of place 4.28 2.18 10031
Med HH income 10.38.14 10031
Med HH inc2 107.743.0 10031
Gini .41 .03 10031
Race .36 .14 10031
Ethnic .67 .07 10031
NGOV62 89.84 90.78 10031
MANSHR .17 .05 10031
NOMIXMARRIAGE .19 .40 5901
NOBLKDINNER .68 .47 4493
BLKNOPUSH .32 .47 2885
NOHALFSCHOOL .19 .39 5717
RACTEACH .44 .50 4661
NOBLKPRESID .12 .33 5872



























(b)Figure 3: Average membership rate, 1973-94
.missing
Range of values










0.538 to 0.665Figure 4: Cmi coefficient, 1972-94
Range of values
(No. of states in parenthesis)
0.429 to 0.487 (11)
0.413 to 0.429 (9)
0.406 to 0.413 (7)
0.396 to 0.406 (12)
0.377 to 0.396 (12)Figure 5: Racial fragmentation, 1990
—a. Range of values










(11)Figure 6: Ethnic fragmentation, 1990
Range of values
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Figure8: Heterogeneity and social capitalTable 1: Descriptive statistics
Panel A: Summary statistics
Member of any group
Member of church group
Member of fraternity
Member of service group
Member of hobby club
Member of sport club
Member of youth group
Member of literary group
Member of school service group
Member of school fraternity
Member of veterans' group
Member of political group
Member of nationality group
Member of union
Member of professional association
Member of farmers' group


































*denotessignificance at the 5 percent level, **atthe 1 percent level.
(a) Average membership rate in the MSA.Table 2: Individual determinants of participation
Marg. Probit coeff.(°)Std. errorb
Cohort .002* (.001)
Age<30 -.032 (.028)






Educ<12 yrs .125** (.013)
Educ>16 yrs .145** (.011)
Children 5 yrs .033** (.014)












*denotessignificance at the 10 percent level, **atthe 5 percent level.
(a) Marginal probit coefficients calculated at the means.
(b) Standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustering of the residuals at
the MSA level.Table 3: Heterogeneity and participation
[1] [21 [31 [4] [5] [6]
Size of place -.002 -.001 -.003-.001 -.002-.001
(.002)(.002)(.002)(.002)(.002)(.002)
MedHHincome 3.441**5.002** 3.861** 4.404** 3.401*4.195**
(1.668) (1.858)(1.858)(1.848)(1.816) (1.915)
Med HHinc.2 _.176**.248** .193** .221** .173**_.211**
(.079) (.088) (.089) (.088) (.087) (.091)
Gini 1.017** .503** .870** 533**
(.247) (.254)(.231)(.268)




INDIV CONTROLS(a) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
STATES Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
YEARS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. obs. 10031 10031 10031 10031 10031 10031
Pseudo Rsq .09 .09 .09 .09 .09 .09
ObservedP .72 .72 .72 .72 .72 .72
PredictedP .74 .74 .74 .74 .74 .74
Notes:
* denotessignificance at the 10 percent level, **atthe 5 percent level.
Marginal probit coefficients calculated at the means. Standard errors corrected for het-
eroskedasticity and clustering of the residuals at the MSA level.
(a) Individual controls: all those listed in Table 2.Table 4:Sensitivityanalysis
Dependent variable: Dependent variable:
Member Member (excl.
Exci. influential observations (b) nationalitygroups)







INDIV CONTROLS(a) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
STATES Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
YEARS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. obs. 9464 9414 9503 9922 9922
Pseudo Rsq .11 .13 .12 .09 .09
ObservedP .74 .75 .74 .72 .72
PredictedP .77 .79 .77 .74 .74
Notes:
*denotessignificance at the 10 percent level, **atthe 5 percent level.
Marginal probit coefficients calculated at the means. Standard errors corrected for het-
eroskedasticity and clustering of the residuals at the MSA level.
(a) Individual controls: all those listed in Table 2.
(b) Influential observations identified by predicting DFbetas for the relevant variable from


















INDIV CONTROLS(a)Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
STATES Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes




















*denotessignificance at the 10 percent level, **atthe 5 percent level.
Marginal probit coefficients calculated at the means. Standard errors corrected for het-
eroskedasticity and clustering of the residuals at the MSA level.






MANSHRTable 6: Participation by type of group°)
Marginal Pro bit coefficients on:
Dependent variable is Cmi RaceEthnic
Membership in












Literary groups(b) -.071 -.025-.039
(.214) (.051)(.079)








Nationality groups .047 .017 .071*
(.092) (.016)(.039)
Unions1 -.076 -.021 .078
(.247) (.050)(.082)
Professional associations1 .225 .156 .331*
(.429) (.103)(.174)
Farmers' groups(h) -1.685 .365 .184
(5.770)(.547)(1.139)
Other groups .i61 -.044-.050
(.230) (.039)(.073)
Notes:* denotessignificance at the 10 percent level, **atthe 5 percent level.
Marginal probit coefficients calculated at the means. Standard errors corrected for
heteroskedasticity and clustering of the residuals at the MSA level.
Each cell reports the marginal probit coefficient on the variable listed in the column
heading from a regression in which the dependent variable is membership in the type of
group described in the row heading. All regressions include the individual controls listed
in Table 2, state, and year dummies.
(a) The sample for each regression is restricted to those individuals who can potentially
be members of that particular group.
(b) Sample includes individuals with at least 12 years of education.
()Sampleincludes individuals younger than 50.
(d) Sample includes individuals with children age 6 to 17.
(e) Sample includes cohorts 1920 to 1955.
(f) Sample includes production, clerical, sales, and service workers.
(g) Sample includes professional workers.
(h) Sample includes only workers whose occupation code corresponds to Agriculture.
Due to the small size of the sample, state and year dummies are omitted from these
regressions.Table 7: Participation and aversion to racial mixing















[2]Have not had black home for dinner(b)













[4]Oppose your children going to school with


























* denotessignificance at the 10 percent level, **atthe 5 percent level.
Marginal probit coefficients calculated at the means. Standard errors corrected for het-
eroskedasticity and clustering of the residuals at the MSA level.
All regressions include the individual controls listed in Table 2, state, and year dummies.
(a) The results do not change significantly if the sample is restricted to whites only.
(b) Sample includes non-blacks only.